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Abstract. Current and emerging trends such as cloud computing, fog
computing, and more recently, multi-access edge computing (MEC) in-
crease the interest in finding solutions to the verifiable computation prob-
lem. Furthermore, the number of computationally weak devices have in-
creased drastically in recent years due to the ongoing realization of the
Internet of Things. This work proposes a solution which enjoys the follow-
ing two desirable properties: (1) cost of input preparation and verification
is very low (low enough to allow verifiable outsourcing of computations
by resource-constrained devices on constrained networks); (2) the run-
ning time of the verifiable computation is RAM-like.
Keywords: Verifiable computation · Outsourcing · RAM · VRAM
1 Introduction
Verifiable outsourcing of computations involves a possibly computationally weak
outsourcing party (outsourcer), and one or more worker parties (evaluators)
who are possibly untrusted by the outsourcer. The outsourcer sends the inputs
for the computation to the evaluator, and the evaluator sends back the result
of the computation along with some additional information which enables the
outsourcer to verify the received result. How much the outsourcer benefits from
outsourcing depends on how much less the cost of verification is compared to the
cost of performing the computation, CostC . Obviously, if the cost of verification
is greater than or equal to CostC , the outsourcer would rather perform the
computation itself. It is also desirable that, the cost of the verifiable computation
to the evaluator is as close as possible to CostC .
Solutions to the verifiable computation problem based on Yao’s Garbled Cir-
cuit (GC) construction enjoy the non-interactivity and inherent verifiability of
secure 2-party computations using GCs, but they have to defeat two great chal-
lenges before they can be of practical value: the single-use nature of the garbled
circuit, and the inflation of size and running time due to the conversion to
Boolean circuit. Simply converting a RAM program to a circuit, and then gar-
bling and evaluating it, leads to solutions with circuit-like running times, which is
significantly worse compared to the running time of the original RAM program.
The solution presented in this work does not address the inflation of size, but it
does achieve RAM-like running time. The verifiable RAM (VRAM) construction
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which underlies the solution sits somewhere between the simple conversion to
circuit and the intricate GRAM constructions [3]. The design of VRAM is based
on RAM concepts, but unlike GRAM, all the construction work takes place at
compile time at a cost similar to circuit construction. The construction under-
lying the solution is not oblivious, and the solution does not provide privacy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides necessary
background information on the random-access machine and garbled circuits. Sec-
tion 3 develops the necessary concepts for describing VRAM, and provides an
informal description of it. Section 4 describes the algorithms which define the
VRAM scheme, and Section 5 puts these algorithms together within a proto-
col, which serves as the formal description of the proposed solution. Section 6
concludes the paper and discusses future work.
2 Background
2.1 Random-Access Machine (RAM)
The random-access machine (RAM) models the essential features of the tradi-
tional serial computer [4]. RAM model of computation resembles the operation
of modern computers much more closely compared to logic circuits. The random-
access machine consists of a central processing unit (CPU) and a random-access
memory, which are connected to each other and interact (See Fig. 1). The CPU
has a small (compared to the random-access memory) internal memory com-
prised of special-purpose memory locations called registers, and (for efficiency
reasons) all CPU operations are performed on data stored in these registers.
The random-access memory is modeled as a collection of m w-bit words, each of
which is identified by a memory address. The random-access memory stores both
data and collections of CPU instructions called programs. The CPU repeatedly
reads an instruction from the random-access memory and executes it, modifying
data in the process. The set of all instructions comprise the instruction set (IS).
A typical IS includes memory load and store instructions for moving data be-
tween memory locations and registers, jump instructions, arithmetic and logical
instructions, as well as input and output instructions, and a HALT instruction.
Branching and loops in high-level languages correspond to conditional jumps and
conditional backward jumps, respectively. In a conditional jump, the CPU either
reads the next instruction in forward direction, or ‘jumps’ to an instruction out
of sequence and reads that one, depending on the result of a comparison. With-
out loss of generality, the random-access memory can be considered as the union
of five disjoint memory regions R, P , X , Y and D. The registers will be consid-
ered as part of the memory, for the sake of simplifying notation. The read-only
X and P are the regions where the input to the program and the program itself
are loaded, respectively. Y is the region where the computation result is written
at the end of the computation: without loss of generality, and for reasons that
will become clear later, we assume that the last thing a program does is to write
the computation result into Y . Everything else (e.g. local and global variables)
is stored in D. Then, a RAM computation can be expressed as Y = PD(X),
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where PD denotes that the program P can read the initial memory contents of
D, as well as reading from locations in D having written to those locations itself.
While the latter class of actions treat D as merely temporary storage, the ability
of the programs to read the initial contents of D qualifies it as persistent memory
which persists between executions of several possibly different programs. R on
the other hand is not persistent, and a program P should read a location in R
only if it has written to it.
Fig. 1. The two main components of the random-access machine: CPU and the random-
access memory.
Compared to the most efficient equivalent circuit, a RAM program has sig-
nificantly better average running time, as the circuit evaluation involves (1)
evaluating both branches for each branching, and (2) running each loop the
maximum possible number of times it can run. On the other hand, RAM exe-
cution is not oblivious (to the inputs) while the circuit evaluation is. However,
while obliviousness is a desirable property for private computations, that is not
necessarily the case for verifiable computations.
2.2 Garbled Circuits (GC)
Yao’s Garbled Circuit (GC) construction [5,6] has given rise to numerous re-
search papers, mostly in the area of secure computation. In later years, the orig-
inal idea has been formalized under the name garbling schemes [2]. A garbling
scheme comprises five algorithms Gb,En,Ev,De, ev such that: (1) (F, e, d) ←
Gb(1k, f), where Gb is given a security parameter, and the function f which is
to be computed. Gb yields F , e, and d which describe the garbled function, the
encoding function, and the decoding function, respectively. (2) X = En(e, x),
where x is the input, and X is the garbled input. (3) Y = Ev(F,X), where Y
is the garbled output. (4) y = De(d, Y ), where y is the un-garbled output. (5)
y = ev(f, x).
Yao’s original construction can be described using the syntax above for gar-
bling schemes as follows. In case of Yao’s original construction, Gb garbles a
circuit representing a function f , and ev is the usual circuit evaluation. Gb starts
by assigning to each wire in the circuit, two keys k0 and k1 corresponding to the
two possible wire values 0 and 1, respectively. For each gate gr, the keys k
0
s , k
1
s ,
k0t , and k
1
t are used to double-encrypt the keys k
0
r and k
1
r , where each one of s
and t is either a gate index for a gate whose output wire is connected to an input
4 T. C. M. Do¨nmez
wire of gr, or an index of an input wire for the circuit. The two encryption keys
and the key to be encrypted are chosen respecting the structure of the truth
table (TT), so that the evaluation of the garbled circuit with the garbled inputs
mimics the in-the-clear evaluation with the corresponding non-garbled inputs.
This step is closely related to the correctness condition for the garbling schemes:
De(d,Ev(F,En(e, x))) = ev(f, x). The process yields the encrypted truth table
(ETT) for the gate (See Fig. 2). Finally, the rows of the ETTs are shuffled, so
that the values on a gate’s input wires cannot be inferred from the index of the
row opened during the evaluation. In this case, Ev resembles the usual circuit
evaluation in terms of the processing order of the gates, however gate evalua-
tions involve undoing the double encryptions, rather than doing simple look-ups
in the TTs. Selection of the row to be decrypted may be carried out via trial and
error (possible if authenticated encryption is used), or via the point-and-permute
technique [1]. En and De are as simple as following the mappings between the
bit values 0 and 1, and the corresponding key values.
Fig. 2. An encrypted gate.
3 The Verifiable RAM (VRAM)
This section describes the verifiable RAM (VRAM). In order to achieve this, the
necessary concepts for describing VRAM will be introduced, and examples will
be given for providing context.
A VRAM construction allows one-time verifiable computation. It is built
on the principle that the execution of a VRAM program can advance so long
as the memory access pattern of the VRAM program ‘mimics’ the memory
access pattern of the (non-verifiable) RAM program from which the VRAM
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program was built. Otherwise, the execution shall not advance. The memory
access pattern involves not just the locations accessed, but also the type of
access (read or write) and the value read or written.
3.1 VRAM Random-Access Memory
The random-access memory of the VRAM will be referred to as encoded memory,
and will be denoted by Mv. Mv holds encodings of the bits of data manipulated
by the program, but not the program itself. Using the notation from Section 2.1,
only the memory regions R, X , Y , and D are encoded, and the VRAM program
is never loaded into the encoded memory. Rv, Xv, Yv, and Dv will denote the
encoded twins of R, X , Y , and D, respectively. In order to keep a one-to-one
correspondence between the regions and simplify the descriptions, region P of
M will be omitted in the rest of this work:
M = (R||X ||Y ||D)
Mv = (Rv||Xv||Yv||Dv)
In case of persistent memory, X and D may both be read as input, affecting the
path of execution. The reason for defining a separate region X becomes clear in
the context of verifiable computations. It is the regionX that stores the inputs of
the outsourcing party, whereas D might be some large database whose contents
may have been altered by previous computations, and may affect the outcome
of the current computation, just as contents of X does.
If the word length of RAM memory M is W , then the word length of Mv
is W · K, where K is the key length, which is the sole security parameter for
the VRAM construction. Locations in M and Mv are denoted by x and xv,
respectively. Each bit value stored at location x, maps to a key whose first bit is
stored at location xv = x·K ofMv. This mapping from bit values to keys is time-
dependent. Time dependency of the mapping is a must because a RAM program
may write the same value to a location at different times during execution, but
the verifiable twin VRAM relies on garbled circuits for its verifiability property,
and garbled circuits require fresh un-exposed keys as inputs. A time-like variable
VRAM time, denoted by t, is incremented by 1 each time a word inM is written.
t also increases due to branchings, as will be explained in the next subsection.
The last write times tw[x] are separately kept for each memory location x, to
be used during the construction of the VRAM program. tw[x] = 0 for all x at
t = 0, and when some memory location x′ is written to at t = t′, tw[x
′] is set to
t′, whether or not the old and new bit values are different.
The crucial feature of the encoded memory to keep in mind is that memory
writes to M are reflected in the VRAM as time-translation of keys, which take
place even when the value in M remains unchanged.
3.2 VRAM CPU and VRAM Programs
It was mentioned in Section 2.1 that a RAM computation can be expressed as
Y = PD(X). Our goal is to obtain a verifiable version of the same computa-
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tion, which yields Yv = P
Dv
v (Xv). Previous subsection described how memory
is encoded. This subsection describes how the VRAM program Pv can be built
from P . Definition of a separate entity VRAM CPU is not necessary, as the
VRAM program will cover the functionality associated with both the CPU and
the RAM program P .
A VRAM program consists of several garbled circuits, each belonging to one
of the three categories B, T , or I. Type B (branch) and type T (time-merge)
circuits together model a conditional jump, and type I (instruction) circuits
model any instruction which alters memory. Type B circuits guarantee that
only a single branch -the correct one for the given inputs- can be followed, and
type T circuits are needed for merging branches, and more generally, for handling
input-dependent program behaviour. Type I circuits may be further categorized
into sub-types which closely resemble the operations in instruction sets such as
x86 and x86 64, and they guarantee thatMv is altered in a way that is consistent
with its twin M at each time step, i.e. the memory access pattern is mimicked.
Before going any further, we define a few concepts which are relevant to both
RAM programs and VRAM programs:
Segment: A segment is an ordered, maximal-length sequence of instructions
which are always executed in sequence, independent of initial memory con-
tents. The sequence order reflects the order in which the instructions are
executed.
Branch: Either a conditional jump or an HALT instruction marks the end of
a segment. In case of a conditional jump, two new segments s1 and s2 are
created, such that at least one of them has non-zero length. The created
segments are called branches. Let the VRAM times associated with the first
and the last instructions in either s1 or s2 be t1 and t2, respectively. t1 − 1
(resp. t2 + 1) is defined as the time of split (resp. time of merge), and is
denoted by ts (resp. tm).
Path of Execution: A path of execution, or an execution path, is an ordered se-
quence of segments visited during a single program execution. The sequence
order reflects the order in which the segments are visited.
The VRAM time runs from t = 0 to t = τ during an execution, where τ is an
input-independent value. Clearly, the input-independent τ is not a measure of
the running time of the RAM, or the VRAM. We define another variable tcost,
which is more relevant for running time measurements, and use it for imposing
a limit on the size of the VRAM program.
The following example aims to clarify these definitions. First, part of a pro-
gram P written in an assembly language is given (See Listing 1.1). Equivalent
code written in a high-level language is given in Listing 1.2. Finally, the VRAM
program Pv built from P is depicted in Fig. 3.
Listing 1.1. Part of a program P written in an assembly language.
;...
LOAD y
STORE x
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LOAD z
JMPZ End
LOAD x ;branch 1
ADD one ;branch 1
STORE x ;branch 1
End:
LOAD x
HALT
Listing 1.2. Equivalent code written in a high-level language.
//...
x = y; //segment 1
if (z != 0) {
x++; //segment 2, branch 1
}
//branch 2 (0-length branch)
return x; //segment 3
Fig. 3. The VRAM program Pv, corresponding to the RAM program P given in List-
ing 1.1.
In Fig. 3, the axis below shows the VRAM time t. Dots indicate garbled circuits.
Type B and T circuits are marked with the respective letter, and all unmarked
dots correspond to type I circuits. A HALT instruction is marked with a square.
In case of type T circuits a single dot is used to represent possibly several T
circuits. In other cases, a single dot represents a single circuit. Segments are
denoted by s, and branches are denoted by br. Branch br1 and the 0-length
branch br2 (which contains only T circuit(s)) both start at t = 5. Time of
split is t = 4 and time of merge is t = 8. The square brackets around the T
circuits are included to emphasize the fact that existence of T circuits at the
end of branches depends on the instructions in both branches. A VRAM time
value and a branch index together define a unique circuit position within the
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structure of a VRAM program. We adapt the convention that, It,b stands for
the type I circuit associated with VRAM time t, and the upper (resp. lower)
branch if b = 0 (resp. b = 1). If a circuit is not associated with any branches, b is
omitted. Same convention is used also for type B and type T circuits. I and B
circuits on the same branch, as well as those that do not belong in any branches,
are drawn at the same height. All T circuits are depicted on a vertical line of
their own.
A challenge in building a VRAM program is the input dependency of the
execution path. Consider the garbled circuit I8 in Fig. 3. I8 takes as input the
encoding keys associated with (x˜, tw[x˜]) for all locations x˜ in which bits of the
program variable x are stored. These input keys have to be known at compile
time so the circuit I8 can be constructed. The variable x is written at t = 2,
and then at t = 7 in only one of the branches, which would mean tw[x˜], and
consequently the input keys, depend on the path of execution, which is unknown
at compile time. But this is not the case. While building the VRAM program,
we make sure that tw[x˜] is input independent, by fast-forwarding keys. Recall
that memory writes are modeled by time translation of keys. Fast-forwarding
is time translation of keys in order to compensate for time discrepancies due
to branching, apart from the normal time translations due to memory writes.
Fast-forwards happen in two ways: (1) explicitly via T circuits; (2) implicitly in
certain I circuits. T circuit(s) are added to the very end of a branch br when
there are memory location(s) x˜ that are modified in the other branch, but not in
br, explicitly fast-forwarding all x˜ to the time of merge. The implicit case occurs
when a memory location x˜ is written by one or more I circuits on a branch.
The very last time some x˜ is written on a branch, the I circuit which does the
writing does not use the VRAM time associated with it to determine the output
keys, but instead uses the time of merge, possibly fast forwarding x˜. There is
one other case where explicit fast-forwards occur. A HALT instruction does not
alter RAM memory, so it has no corresponding I circuit. It is represented in
the VRAM program merely with a marker. These marked positions indicate the
end of each possible path of execution (with possibly different running times)
at compile time, and program termination at runtime. At these positions are T
circuits which fast-forward the whole Yv region to t = τ , making possible the
verification of computation result using a single key pair per location.
While building the VRAM program, we have to ensure that the computing
party can follow only the correct path of execution while executing the VRAM
program. This is achieved by replacing each conditional jump in the RAM pro-
gram with a circuit which evaluates the condition (e.g. ‘is zero?’ for JMPZ), and
outputs one of the two branch keys depending on the result. Each garbled circuit
on a branch, regardless of its type, is encrypted with the corresponding branch
key. Below, we present two more examples before taking a closer look at the
garbled circuits involved. In order to save space, we only give the high-level lan-
guage code. We won’t be precise about segment lengths and t values, and will
concentrate on the VRAM program structure instead.
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Listing 1.3. Example 2. A simple RAM program.
execSegment1();
if (condition1) {
execSegment2();
} else if (condition2)
execSegment3(); //last statement is a return
} else {
execSegment4();
}
execSegment5(); //last statement is a return
Fig. 4. The VRAM program corresponding to the RAM program given in Listing 1.3.
Listing 1.3 contains a typical if-else statement. One thing to note in Fig. 4 is
that the first branching is already merged before the second one takes place. In
some sense, building a VRAM program involves flattening the associated RAM
program into two-branch thickness, by considering the expanded VRAM time
instead of the regular running time of a RAM program. In general, a VRAM
program handles at most two branches at each VRAM time t. Another thing to
note in this example is that the RAM program includes two return statements
(i.e. HALT instructions), and both TO,0 and Tτ fast-forward Yv to t = τ .
Listing 1.4. Example 3. A simple RAM program.
execSegment1();
while (condition1) {
execSegment2();
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}
execSegment3(); //last statement is a return
Fig. 5. The VRAM program corresponding to the RAM program given in Listing 1.4.
Listing 1.4 contains a while loop. The things to note in this example are that:
(1) TM,1, TN,1, ... , TO,1 all fast-forward their input keys to the same VRAM
time t = tm; (2) each B circuit outputs either the branch key to encrypt the
immediately following (s2 segment, B circuit) pair, or the branch key to encrypt
s3.
3.3 Building the I, B, T garbled circuits
Circuits of each type have quite simple structure, so we will provide only one ex-
ample of each.We will assume that (1) IS = {LOAD, STORE, ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV, JMP,
JMPZ, JMPN, HALT}; (2) the instruction LOAD loads its parameter into register r;
(3) the instruction JMPZ makes the comparison with the value in register r.
The keys for encoding memory are generated from a pseudo-random function
F k(x, t, b), and the branch keys used by B circuits are generated from a PRF
F br(t, br). x is a memory location in M , t is the VRAM time, b, br ∈ {0, 1} are
a bit value and a branch index, respectively.1
First, we construct I3 which corresponds to the instruction LOAD z in List-
ing 1.1. I3 is an I circuit with sub-type LOAD. Suppose that the location of the
word holding variable z is xz, and the location of the register r in R is xr. In this
case, the circuit being built is simply all the circuits for loading individual bits,
bundled together.2 So we consider only the circuit I03 responsible from loading
1 Note that neither of these PRFs plays the same role it plays in the original GRAM
construction, where the PRF key is embedded in some of the circuits to allow part
of construction work to be done in runtime.
2 This is not always the case. For example, the individual bits mix together due to
carry bits for the ADD instruction.
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the first bit of z at xz . I
0
3 is a gate with a single input wire and a single output
wire, whose two ETT rows R0, R1 are:
R0 = Ek0(F
k
sk
(xr, 3, 0))
R1 = Ek1(F
k
sk
(xr, 3, 1))
where k0 = F ksk(xz , tw[xz], 0), and k
1 = F ksk(xz , tw[xz ], 1).
Next, we consider B4, the B circuit which corresponds to the instruction
JMPZ End in Listing 1.1. B4 is a circuit withW input wires, whereW is the word
length. Two output wires give the branch key (left wire) and branch index (right
wire). Let ith bit of r be at location xir. Then the i
th input wire of B4 accepts
as inputs k0i = F
k
sk
(xir , tw[x
i
r] = 3, 0) and k
1
i = F
k
sk
(xir , tw[x
i
r ] = 3, 1). The left
output wire is associated with the keys kup = F brsbr (4, 0) and kdown = F
br
sbr
(4, 1),
where the former is the branch key for the upper, zero-length branch,3 and the
latter is the branch key for the lower branch br1. B4 is built such that it outputs
kup (and 0 for branch index) only for inputs (k00 , k
0
1 , . . . , k
0
W−1), and it outputs
kdown (and 1 for branch index) only when all inputs are accepted but the case
for kup is not true (i.e. r 6= 0). In all other cases, B4 may output garbage values.
Finally, we consider one of the T circuits depicted in Fig. 3 as T5,1.
4 A T
circuit is almost identical to an I circuit with sub-type LOAD, except that the
memory location read and written are the same, so the T circuit merely time-
translates a single word. Again, a circuit which operates on a word can be thought
of as W circuits, each time-translating a single bit, bundled together. The ETT
rows R0, R1 of T
i
5,1 which time-translates the i
th bit are:
R0 = Ek0 (F
k
sk
(xi, tm = 8, 0))
R1 = Ek1 (F
k
sk
(xi, tm = 8, 1))
where k0 = F ksk(xi, tw[xi], 0), and k
1 = F ksk (xi, tw[xi], 1). Unlike the circuits
considered in the previous examples, T5,1 is on a branch. What is added to
the VRAM program is not the circuit, but the ciphertext resulting from its
encryption using the branch key kup = F brsbr (4, 0).
4 The VRAM Scheme
The VRAM scheme is comprised of the following four algorithms: APROG,
AINPUT , AV ERIFY , and AEXEC . These describe construction of a VRAM pro-
gram, encoding of inputs, verification of a computation result, and execution of
a VRAM program, respectively.
3 The branch is zero-length, but kup is not useless, as it is used for encrypting T5,1.
4 These circuits emulate the writes that happen only in the other branch. There are
3 I circuits on the other branch br1 which write to at most 3 different locations, so
up to 3 T circuits may be needed on the other branch.
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AINIT (τprev)
Description: A subroutine in APROG. Prepares t, tstart, τ , and tw[x] for a
new computation.
Preconditions: PRF F k, F br, and the corresponding PRF keys sk, sbr are
fixed.
Inputs: τprev : the termination time (τ ) of the last built (via APROG) VRAM
program.a
1. Set tstart = τprev.
2. Set τ = 0.
3. If τprev = 0:
– Set t = 0.
– Set t[w] = 0 for all x in M .
a Several VRAM programs may be built to operate on the persistent memory
Dv.
Pv, tstart, τ ← APROG(P, τprev)
Description: Builds a verifiable version of the given RAM program.
Preconditions: Pv is empty.
Inputs: P : RAM program; τprev : the VRAM time at which the last built
program ends. 0 if there is no previously built VRAM program.
Outputs: Pv : VRAM program. A collection of labeled and possibly encrypted
garbled circuits; tstart : The VRAM time when Pv starts; τ : The VRAM
time when Pv terminates.
1. Prepare for a new computation by running AINIT (τprev).
2. Systematically follow every path of execution for the given RAM program
P . We will assume the same IS from Section 3.3. For each path, do:
– Set tcost = 0.
– While tcost < MAXcost and no HALT instruction is encountered, do:
• Pick the next instruction inst on the execution path.
• Increment tcost by 1.
a
• If inst ∈ {LOAD, STORE, ADD, SUB, MUL, DIV}, then build an I circuit
with the corresponding sub-type, and update tw with current time
t for the memory location written. However, if inst is on a branch,
and the target location is written for the last time on this branch
(implicit fast-forward), then (1) build I s.t. it time-translates to
the time of merge instead of current time; (2) update tw with time
of merge for the memory location written. If inst is the final in-
struction on the branch, build T circuits which emulate the writes
that happen only in the other branch (explicit fast-forward), and
set t to the time of merge. Otherwise, increment t by 1.
• If inst ∈ {JMPZ, JMPN}, then build a B circuit. Increment t by 1.
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• If inst is an HALT instruction, then build T circuits which fast-
forward each key in Yv to τ . This action is delayed until all paths
are exhausted, and τ is fixed.b Add a dummy element to Pv with
type field in the circuit label set to HALT.
• For each circuit built during the processing of inst, prepare wire
labels and a circuit label. Wire labels associate with each wire
the memory location read or written.c Circuit label indicates the
VRAM time when the circuit was built, type (I ,B,T ), and also
the branch index (0 for ‘upper’ branch, 1 for ‘lower‘ branch) if the
circuit is on a branch. We adopt the convention that the branch
that is followed when the condition evaluates to true is the upper
branch. If a circuit is not on a branch, label it and add it to Pv.
Otherwise, encrypt the circuit with the corresponding branch key
and add the labeled ciphertext to Pv.
– Let the largest t value observed on the path be tmax. If tmax > τ , then
set τ = tmax.
3. Set τprev = τ .
4. Return Pv, tstart, τ .
a We make the simplifying assumption that every instruction has the same
cost.
b One other possibility is to use a predetermined τ value which is guaranteed
to exceed all tmax. Using a τ value which is larger than necessary has no
drawbacks.
c An exception is the output wires of a type B circuit.
Xv ← AINPUT (X,F
k, sk, tstart)
Description: Input preparation.
1. Let X(x) = b, where b ∈ {0, 1}. For each location x in X, set the key at
the corresponding location xv in Xv to F
k
sk
(x, tstart, b).
2. Return Xv.
Y ← AV ERIFY (Yv, F
k, sk, τ )
Description: Verification.
1. For each location y in Y :
– Let the key at the corresponding location yv in Yv be ky . Let
F ksk (y, τ, b) = k
b
y, b ∈ {0, 1}.
– If kby = ky, set Y (y) = b.
– If ky /∈ {k
0
y , k
1
y}, then the verification failed. Return ⊥.
2. If ky ∈ {k
0
y , k
1
y} for all y, then Y is accepted as the verified result of the
computation. Return Y .
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Yv ← AEXEC(Pv, Xv , Dv)
Description: Execute the VRAM program. Execution may alter Dv , as well
as Yv.
Inputs: Pv : VRAM program. A collection of labeled and possibly encrypted
garbled circuits; Xv : Inputs to the VRAM program; Dv : Encoded persis-
tent memory.
Outputs: Yv : Encoded computation result.
1. Set variable br = −1. br holds current branch index at any time during
execution. Value −1 stands for no branch.
2. Set variable kbr = null. kbr holds the branch key for the current branch.
3. Set variable halt = false.
4. Execution involves iterating over and processing the elements in the col-
lection Pv. Most likely, only a small portion of the elements which are
associated with a single path of execution have to be processed. Order of
processing is determined by the labels. The element which is picked next
for processing is the one with the smallest VRAM time in its label. If
br 6= −1, only elements with same branch index br in its label can be
picked. An element is only picked once. If more than one elements are el-
igible for picking (i.e. they are labeled with the same VRAM time), type
I and B circuits are picked before type T circuits. Elements with type set
to HALT are picked last. In other cases, e.g. among types I and B, the pick
can be made arbitrarily. While there is an element eligible for picking:
– Pick the next element.
– If br 6= −1, decrypt the circuit using kbr.
– For each input wire, read fromMv the key associated with the location
in the wire label. Assign each key read to the corresponding input wire.
Evaluate the garbled circuit.
– Read circuit type from circuit label.
– If type is I or T , then for each output wire, read from the wire label
the write location, and write the key assigned to the output wire (i.e.
the evaluation result) to the corresponding location in Mv . If type is T
and there are no more eligible elements labeled with the same t, then
set br = −1 and kbr = null.
– If type is B, then set the key on the left output wire to kbr, and set
the value on the right output wire to br.
– If type is HALT, then set halt = true.
5. If halt = false, return ⊥. (MAXcost was chosen poorly)
6. Return Yv.
Note that extra work has to be done for a branch br that is not executed. The
extra work is proportional to the number of distinct memory locations accessed
exclusively in br, and is independent of the running time of br. The extra work
that has to be done for a loop is proportional to the number of times it is
executed. The verifiable RAM program terminates at exactly the same point
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along the path of execution as its non-verifiable counterpart. The running time
of a VRAM program is RAM-like.
5 Protocol for Outsourcing VRAM Programs
This section presents a protocol for verifiable outsourcing of computations on
persistent memory. The protocol consists of a preprocessing phase and an online
phase, and works in a three-party setting. The parties involved are the outsourcer
(a possibly computationally weak party who outsources the computations and
verifies the results), the evaluator (a computationally capable untrusted party
who performs the computations), and the constructor (a computationally ca-
pable trusted party who builds the verifiable programs corresponding to the
outsourced computations).5
5.1 Preprocessing Phase
The constructor prepares all the preprocessing material without the involvement
of the outsourcer and the evaluator, who may receive their share of the prepro-
cessing material anytime before the first outsourced computation begins, and
possibly at different times.
Preprocessing Phase
1. Pv, tstart, τ ← APROG(P, τprev) Constructor builds the VRAM program.
2. Constructor sends F k, sk, tstart, τ to the outsourcer.
3. Constructor sends Pv, Xv , Dv to the evaluator.
5.2 Online Phase
Parties involved in the online phase are the outsourcer and the evaluator.
Online Phase
1. Xv ← AINPUT(X,F
k, sk, tstart) When outsourcer wants to outsource a
computation, it decides on its inputs X, prepares inputs for the VRAM
program, and initiates the computation by sending Xv to evaluator.
2. Yv ← AEXEC(Pv,Xv,Dv) Evaluator executes the VRAM program and
sends the result Yv to outsourcer.
3. Y ← AVERIFY(Yv,F
k, sk, τ ) Outsourcer verifies the received result. If
AV ERIFY returns ⊥, outsourcer concludes that evaluator tried to cheat,
and the protocol terminates. Otherwise, outsourcer accepts Y as the veri-
fied result of the computation.
5 By (un)trusted we mean (un)trusted by the outsourcer.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
This work proposed a solution to the verifiable computation problem which
accepts resource-constrained devices as outsourcers, and offers RAM-like running
times to evaluators. The other side of the coin is that the computational and
memory costs of building VRAM programs incurred on the constructor, the
cost incurred on the network due to the size of the VRAM programs, or the
memory cost of storing VRAM programs incurred on the evaluator might not
be tolerable. Moreover, a VRAM program can be used only once. However, there
is also reason to be hopeful. First of all, the possibly intolerable costs mentioned
above all concern the preprocessing phase of the protocol, and the online phase
of the protocol is efficient. Secondly, it seems possible that the memory and
communication costs associated with the constructor and evaluator can be made
amortizable over several computations.
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